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1. Introduction and objectives
Recent years have seen the re-emergence
of industrial policies and policies for the
promotion of economic activity in both
industrialised and developing countries,
flanked by regional and national strategies
for enhanced integration into increasingly
globalised international markets, improved
competitiveness and sustainably dynamic
economic growth. The growing popularity
of these policies is also a reflection of
recent currents in international economic
debate, notably the argument that the
recipes for stability staunchly championed
by neo-liberals, which gave rise to the
Washington Consensus in the early
eighties, need to be complemented by more
committed policies designed to strengthen
international competitiveness.
A number of international bodies, such as
the OECD, the ILO, the UN institutions,
the WTO and the World Bank itself, are
currently pushing more emphatically for
frameworks of exchange and promoting
comparisons of experience and best
practice in matters such as attracting
investment and business, promoting R&D
and technological transfer, stimulating
clusters and business networks, incentives
for start-ups and entrepreneurship. There is
a recognition that the success of particular
policies will inevitably depend on the
economic, political and social context in
which they are applied, and also on the
structural challenges which the national or
regional economy concerned should be or
has been confronting.
The German Federal State of North Rhine-
Westphalia (henceforth NRW) is a
particularly interesting case for at least
three reasons. First, huge areas within this
territory – such as the Ruhr and Aachen –
have undergone radical industrial
conversion over the last decades, thereby
responding to a need for new competitive
products and services to counter the
definitive decline of the formerly
hegemonic cluster consisting of coal, steel
and mechanical engineering which had
powered the economy in these areas from
the mid-19th century until the early 1960s.
The second reason is that over the last
thirty years the State government, drawing
on resources of its own boosted by local,
Federal and European funds, has actively
promoted the restructuring of the regional
economy by means of a sweeping
communication strategy, a broad range of
instruments and initiatives to promote
industry, subsidies, and political and
financial support for the creation of public-
private institutions which have enriched
the region's "meso-economic"1 framework,
generating exchanges with the public
apparatus at state, regional and local levels
but also with employers' associations and
trade unions, and furthermore providing a
new spectrum of support services adapted
to the needs of business.
A third factor which makes NRW
especially interesting as a case study is the
                                         
1 Examples of the "meso-economic" framework
include public institutions and back-up services
to promote industrial development and
workforce training, employers' associations,
institutions devoted to R&D and technology
transfer, management support centres,
incubation parks, bodies designed to skill and
upgrade human resources, etc. The meso-level
also embraces forums for social dialogue,
public policy co-ordination committees and
public-private networks designed to inject
momentum into economic development or
stimulate debate on related issues. For further
details see Esser, Hillebrand, Messner and
Meyer-Stamer (1996).
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degree and nature of decentralisation
which has been achieved by these
economic development policies. Due to the
socio-cultural make-up of this territory2,
the process of conversion and economic
stimulation has entailed vigorous dialogue
between geographically dispersed players.
Decentralisation from state to regional and
local level is most obvious in relation to
operational decision-making and the
capacity to provide it, but these local
structures have clearly acquired a status
which goes well beyond the
implementation of policies adopted and
passed down by the state government. In
addition, they have been endowed with
various technical mechanisms of their own,
such as forums where views are exchanged
and projects prioritised, combined with a
close-knit network of autonomous
institutions able to provide the financial
management and engineering to advance
projects by drawing on funding from every
administrative tier.
This does not mean that structural
transformation within NRW is now
complete and its success firmly
established. There are still high rates of
unemployment, notably in the Ruhr Area,
home to a third of NRW's population.
Indeed, most economic growth indicators
are still below the national average. Coal
mining still receives considerable subsidies
enabling it to survive, even though it has
lost its competitive edge and has been cut
back dramatically. Likewise, some of the
                                         
2 One distinctive feature of this federal state is a
marked presence of social organisations,
employers' associations and trade unions at
local or sub-State level, a relatively
homogenous, polycentric population
distribution, and a relatively high level of
functional specialisation within the territory,
based on municipalities or districts (Kreise).
policies and initiatives pursued in recent
years are debatable, both conceptually and
empirically, in terms of their efficiency and
effectiveness.
This article will not attempt to describe in
detail the industrial promotion policies
pursued by the State within the framework
of its strategy for structural change. Rather,
it will present the author's impressions
from the perspective of a visitor with a
certain expertise in the field of industrial
policy, but nevertheless a total stranger to
the territorial, economic and socio-cultural
co text of structural transformation in
NRW. I shall try to systematise these
impressions, to identify the fundamental
f atures, and to formulate some questions
and reflections which may help us to
understand more precisely how this
strategy has progressed, what results it has
a hieved to date, how it is likely to
continue and what challenges remain
unsolved.
To these purposes I have divided the paper
into four sections. To begin, I shall briefly
explain the causes and principal economic
ef ects of the decline in the traditional
industries and describe the strategies
adopted by the leading companies in this
coal/steel/metalworking cluster, hoping
thereby to convey the magnitude of the
structural crisis which arose in the regional
economy and the categorical need for
conversion.
In the second section I shall summarise the
m in thrust of the ensuing strategy for
tructural change, highlighting three
factors which, in my view, can be regarded
as the constituent elements of this strategy:
the sheer magnitude of the challenge, the
active leadership role assumed by the State
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government and how this has evolved over
the years, and the impact which
globalisation and Europeanisation have
had or are likely to have in future on the
internal and external conditions of
transformation.
The third section raises some lines of
argument with regard to as yet unresolved
aspects of the strategy for structural change
in NRW. These relate first and foremost to
the activation of a meso-economic network
within a highly decentralised environment
with open institutional redundancies which
affect the dynamics and intensity of the
whole process and, secondly, to the need to
allocate new roles and initiate mechanisms
and communication channels aimed at
monitoring and evaluating the impact of
the structural policies adopted, with a view
to ensuring their relevance and optimising
the volume of resources mobilised towards
this goal, given the complex weave of
institutions involved in implementation.
Finally, in the fourth section I will outline
the principal lessons which I believe can be
drawn from the NRW experience, both in
consolidating the future strategy and in
designing and implementing economic
development policies in countries facing
the challenge of industrial modernisation
and competitive credentials, with particular
reference to Chile.
2. The decline of productive
sectors dominant until the
1950s: the crisis in coal and
steel
2.1 Structural crisis in the Ruhr
Area
The Ruhr Area (Ruhrgebiet) accounts for
almost a third of NRW's population, with
5.4 million people distributed across 53
urban communities. In the second half of
the 19th century, the Ruhrgebiet began to
emerge as a powerful production nucleus
centred around the coal industry,
reinforced several decades later by the rise
of the iron and steel sector and the
appearance of a ferrous metalworking
cluster.
There is a wealth of literature on the
characteristics and the evolution of these
traditional Ruhrgebiet industries. I shall
not, therefore, repeat the analysis of history
and trends so ably presented in those
studies, but confine myself to mentioning
some key characteristics in the process of
expansion and, subsequently, decline
which these productive sectors underwent
in the region.3
The coal, steel and related industries took
root and expanded between the latter half
of the 19th century and the 1950s, a decade
marked by post-war conditions. One of the
salient elements defining the pattern of
industry in this area was the presence and
leadership of major groups and consortia
                                         
3 The analysis below is based on Heinze, R.G.,
Hilbert, J. et al. (1996 and 1998) and Fulde, M.
(1996).
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which pursued concentrated production
strategies in the region in order to benefit
from logistic advantages and structures of
transport and distribution, notably along a
chain of coal–energy–steel–derivative
products.
Around these companies/consortia, such as
Thyssen, Krupp and Mannesmann, many
small and medium-sized businesses
sprouted, mainly in derivative fields of
metalworking and related services. The big
enterprises, however, retained their “core
competences” in process and product
engineering, and as a result outsourcing or
the creation of new rivals was never a real
threat in this region throughout the period
in question.
Production began to decline in the
Ruhrgebiet in response to various market
and technological factors. The first
emerged in the late 1950s with cost
pressures on the coal industry due to global
competition. A similar phenomenon was to
hit the steel industry twenty years later.
Whereas market factors directly affected
the output of the Ruhr's "anchor"
industries, rooted in the primary processing
sector, technological factors also had an
impact on the productive cluster in their
orbit, and this encouraged vertical
disintegration, given that productive and
logistic bundling exerted less influence on
the competitive performance of these
industries. Among the technological
factors, the following are particularly
relevant:
· the introduction of new production
technologies for steel and its
derivatives permitting the physical
separation of processes which had
previously been spatially integrated;
 
· a technological shift from the coal-
based chemicals industry towards
petrochemicals;
 
· the dwindling importance of coal in
iron and steel production;
 
· the use of new components in mining
processes, such as optical and
microelectronic sensors, which were
not supplied from within the area;
 
· the absolute and relative decrease of
the transport factor within cost
structures, permitting the import of
components from different points of
origin.
Finally, the dominant companies in the
Ruhrgebiet responded directly to changes
in international market conditions for coal
and steel by adopting a multinational
strategy, including the relocation of iron
and steel capacity to developing countries,
with the creation of foreign subsidiaries.
This phenomenon, combined with a
corporate diversification whereby new
ctivities were established outside the
Ruhr, resulted in a substantial exodus of
capital from the area, so that ultimately
corporate aims became increasingly
detached from regional interests.
These changes had a dramatic effect on
productive activity and employment in the
Ruhrgebiet. The following indicators serve
to reflect the magnitude of the process:4
                                         
4 Data taken from Heinze, Hilbert et al. (1996) and
Danielzyk (1992).
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· the Ruhr's contribution to Germany
GDP fell from 12.2% in 1957 to 8.2%
in 1987;
· jobs in coal-mining were pruned from
400,000 in 1962 to 85,000 in 1994;
 
· over the same period coal output
decreased from somewhat over 120
million tonnes to 50 million tonnes a
year, which at the same time meant a
major increase in productivity;
 
· employment in the iron and steel
industry was cut back from 230,000
jobs in 1965 to 80,000 in 1994;
 
· taking 1960 as index year (= 100),
industrial employment tumbled to
around 45 in the Ruhr in 1992,
compared with 65 for NRW as a whole
and 80 for Germany (excluding the
new eastern states);
 
· from 1980 to 1994 accumulated growth
rates in employment for the Ruhrgebiet
were as follows (in parentheses the
figure for NRW as a whole):
agriculture, energy and mining -36.3%
(-8.2%); manufacturing industry
-28.6% (-10.7%); construction
-20.8% (-6.2%); manufacturing
services 47.3% (50.6%); consumer
services 6.9% (21.0%); social services
48.0% (54.2%). In other words, the
loss of jobs in the industrial primary
sector was much greater in the Ruhr, in
both relative and absolute terms, than
in the rest of NRW, while the
compensating effects of employment
generated in the tertiary sector
(services) were smaller in the
Ruhrgebiet, especially in the case of
consumer services;
 
· given the lack of new sources of
industrial employment in the area until
the 1980s, in spite of this dramatic loss
of jobs, the coal–steel–related
industries chain still accounted for half
the industrial workforce in the Ruhr in
the early half of the nineties.
 
 The challenge of restructuring the Ruhr's
productive economy has not only entailed
technological and economic aspects. The
type of industrialisation which replaced
agriculture as the region's main economic
activity, and the nature of the companies
which led that process, defined a labour
and social structure over the years which
narrowly reflected the requirements of the
dominant sectors, with a distinctly
"polycentric"5 pattern of urban
development and a certain functional
specialisation for each town. This has been
one factor determining the area's ability to
restructure its economy in recent years.6
 
 The logistical supply and distribution
r quirements of industries based in the area
encouraged the development of excellent
roads, rail and inward waterways which are
still a distinctive regional feature offering
business advantages. The broad industrial
base also influenced the pattern of urban
settlement. Towns grew rapidly as workers
flowed in from eastern Germany, Poland
and elsewhere. As a result, several fairly
big towns – Essen, Dortmund and
Duisburg – exist side by side with their
own productive profiles, accompanied by
several slightly smaller ones – Bochum,
Gelsenkirchen, Oberhausen and Mülheim.
The joint population of these seven
                                         
 5 Danielzyk, R. (1992).
6 Cf. Blotevogel, H. (1998)
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communities currently amounts to 3.5
million, or about two thirds of the
inhabitants of the Ruhrgebiet.
 
 The huge presence of low- and medium-
skilled workers in large-scale production
facilities also prompted the formation of
labour organisations with a substantial
membership, which has complicated the
process of industrial restructuring in that
the trade unions have campaigned to
contain the economic and political impact
of change, for example, on employment
and social protection, among other critical
issues.
 
2.2 Some impressions of the
competitive strategies
adopted by   corporate
leaders in the Ruhr coal
and steel cluster
 
 The leading players in the Ruhr cluster of
coal, steel and metalworking opted long
ago for internationalisation by setting up
distribution companies in the main markets
for their products in Europe, the United
States, Asia and Latin America. Later, as
competitive pressure grew from the late
1950s in the coal sector and from the mid-
1970s in the international steel markets,
these players began relocating towards
places which offered cost advantages.
Parallel to this, they entered on a strategy
of corporate diversification, acquiring or
constructing most of the new facilities they
required in other parts of Germany and
abroad.
 
 This product diversification meant that
from the mid-1980s onwards iron and steel
accounted for less than 50% of global
business of each of the five leading
corporate players in the Ruhr. In the case
of Thyssen, steel – which constituted over
60% of global sales in the early seventies –
fell to 36% of annual sales in 1986. That
same year, steel contributed 25.1% to
Mannesmann's business and 49.5% to
turnover at Klöckner. As for Krupp, data
from 1994 suggests that iron and steel
production only represented 28% of annual
sales. The coal giant Ruhrkohle AG, whose
non-mining business accounted for less
than 2% of its global activities in the early
1970s, had increased this share to more
than half by 1994. 7
 
 As factories in the Ruhrgebiet saw their
profitability decline between the late 1960s
and the first half of the 1980s, they tended
to adopt strategies of a defensive nature,
with priorities such as streamlining costs
and the outsourcing of processes and
services. One logical consequence of this
was the loss of jobs, directly but also
indirectly through material suppliers and
service providers within the traditional
cluster. The failure of Krupp in 1986 was a
milestone in this development. The
situation now turned critical, as did
prospects for the local economy,
traditionally geared to the leadership of
these key companies, and as a result
unused to autonomous entrepreneurship
and deficient in innovative capacity.
 
 The present picture reflects a trend towards
corporate restructuring, alliances and even
mergers, as illustrated by the consolidation
of Thyssen Krupp Stahl AG which, since
1997, has positioned itself as Europe's
biggest manufacturer of flat steel, and the
third largest in the world. The region's
                                         
 7 Data compiled from Danielzyk, R. (1992) and
Funder, M. (1996).
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traditional key players are now setting up
highly globalised, competitive
transnational groups covering a broad
spectrum of industries, including
commerce and services,
telecommunications and capital goods with
a high input of cutting-edge technology.
 
 As Table 1 shows, in spite of this
geographical diversification, most of these
companies still have their headquarters in
the Rhine-Ruhr region. This is also the
preferred German location for commercial
distribution companies.
 
 In terms of both number of companies and
also their global turnover, the Rhine-Ruhr
region (i.e. the Ruhrgebiet plus the
Dusseldorf–Cologne–Bonn axis) ranks first
in Germany and third in Europe, behind
London and Paris. Nevertheless, although
Dusseldorf, Cologne and Bonn are
geographically so close to the Ruhr,
differences in history, production and
economic structure make it impossible to
set up common criteria beyond these
aggregate statistics.
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Table 1: Key industrial groups in the present-day Ruhr: Product diversification (% of
total revenues) and location of production facilities
 Group
 Field of business
 
 Thyssen-
Krupp (1995)
 
 Krupp
 (1996)
 
 Mannesmann
(1997)
 
 Ruhrkohle RAG
(1997)
 Coal
 Steel
 Capital goods
 Cars and spare parts
 Engineering,
infrastructure projects
and civil works
 Energy, environment
 
 Trade and commercial
services
 Telecommunications
 Chemicals
 
 Countries where
production is located
with no. of facilities
(in parentheses those
located in the Ruhr
Area)
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Facilities located in the
Ruhr as a percentage
of the total
 
 
 
 33%
 
 27%
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
40%
 
 
 
 
 
 
Germany
27(16);
 Abroad 7:
Netherlands 3;
Spain, Italy,
UK, Brazil 1
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 47%
 
 
 
 29%
 
 31%
 
 21%
 
 
 12%
 
 
 
 
6%
 
 
 
 
 
 
Germany
68(38); Abroad
65:
USA 13; Italy
8; UK 7;
France 6;
Netherlands 5;
Mexico, Brazil
4; Spain 3;
Australia,
Canada, India,
South Africa 2;
Others (7) 1
29%
 
 
 
 
 
 10%
 
 21%
 
 
 42%
 
 
 
 
10%
 
 
17%
Germany 21 (4);
Abroad 16: USA 8;
France 2;
Switzerland, Japan,
Spain, Italy,
Netherlands, Brazil
1
11%
 
 40%
 
 
 
 7%
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
12%
 
 25%
 
 
 
 
15%
Germany 130 (70);
Abroad 48: Neth.,
Italy 7; USA 6;
Belg., Spain 5; UK
3; Australia,
France, Switz.,
Brazil, Mexico 2;
Others (5) 1
39%
Sources: Funder, M (1992); Krupp Annual Report 1997; RAG Annual Report 1997; Mannesmann in
figures, executive report, 1998 and Annual Report 1997; Thyssen Annual Report 1996.
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3. The strategy for structural
transformation: priorities and
components
3.1 Early days: policies to attract
business (Standortpolitik)
 
 At the end of the 1970s the depth of
economic crisis which ensued as the
traditional manufacturing cluster in the
Ruhrgebiet became less and less
competitive provoked a climate of rising
social tension, in which the region's well-
organised labour unions played a major
role. The response of the public sector was
to invest considerable government
subsidies in reskilling the workforce, while
at the same time encouraging new
businesses to start up in the region.
Measures towards industrial relocation,
essentially taken by the government of
NRW at the time, were supported by the
other tiers of administration: national
(Federal), regional (in the districts which
made up the state) and local.
 
 Since these early beginnings in the
seventies, the strategy for structural
transformation was determined around the
central objective of attracting industry to
the state, and above all to the regions
hardest hit by the decline in traditional
sectors, such as the Ruhr Area. As time
passed, there was an evident tendency to
shift away from instruments of an
operational nature towards establishing
regional levels of competence.
 
In 1979, during the Ruhr Conference in
Castrop-Rauxel, the government of North
Rhine–Westphalia announced an Action
Plan for the Ruhr which envisaged a range
of measures geared towards industrial
conversion in the region and economic
revitalisation. The key component of this
Plan was the creation of a Ruhr Property
Development Fund. From 1980 onwards
this acquired about 150 industrial sites
with a total surface areas of approx. 2,000
hectares.
The fund was administered by the LEG,
the State Development Agency. After
redevelopment, a significant proportion of
these sites were resold for new industrial
purposes. Others were reclaimed for urban
functions as green spaces or recreation
zones. A handful were used for residential
development.
Although the Fund was originally set up to
handle properties in the Ruhr, its remit was
extended in 1984 to cover the entire State
of NRW.
 Following the Fund's relatively successful
management by the LEG as a State agency,
proposals began emerging at State level in
the late 1980s for adopting action on a
more decentralised basis. This met with a
positive response from players with
raditionally territorial roles, such as public
administrations in the lower tiers (districts
and municipalities), trade unions and
chambers of industry. The dynamic
process also embraced universities and
bodies associated with the promotion of
industry whose regional and local presence
tends to be more recent, often deliberately
triggered by the State in order to reinforce
its meso-economic base.
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 As a number of authors have described, structural policy in NRW during the 1970s and the first half of the
1980s, which set a precedent in Germany, was defined by three distinctive features:8
 
· it centred on the Ruhr Area, a heartland of the declining coal, iron and steel industries;
· it was designed and implemented through public institutions at State level;
· all measures were based on the direct allocation of resources to activities and fields previously defined
at State level with little influence from regional and local players.
A typical example of this phase was the creation of the Ruhr Property Development Fund, which called for
substantial public subsidy and investment but nevertheless produced results. Certainly, any attempt at
evaluating this instrument would need to confront the problem of ring-fencing and quantifying the various
benefits on the basis of multiple impacts derived from the reinforcement of general and specific location
factors either directly induced or indirectly encouraged by this measure. The following effects serve as
illustrations:
 
· A wide demand for environmental services was generated by the rehabilitation of industrial sites. This
demand functioned as a springboard for the environment industry in its "infancy", which then
proceeded to consolidate a highly competitive performance targeted at both the region itself and
external markets.9
· A range of competitive location factors evolved thanks to the mutual effects of, on the one hand,
existing geographical and infrastructural advantages and, on the other, the large-scale redevelopment of
sites suitable for industrial use.
· Some of these former industrial sites were purchased and rehabilitated for use as green spaces with a
view to enhancing regional amenity value, thereby attracting new kinds of business and improving the
quality of life for residents.
· Since that time a number of complementary measures have been implemented, such as business
incubation parks and centres for technology development and transfer.
 
 
                                         
8 Fürst and Kilper (1995); Noll and Scharfenorth (1997)
9 Cf. Heinze, Hilbert et al. (1996)
3.2 Phase two: encouraging new
structures and forms of
participation
1989 marked a watershed in the State's
campaign to catalyse economic
redevelopment. That year saw the
introduction of two measures which, ten
years later, have confirmed their valuable
role as two seminal experiences in the
evolution of NRW's policy for structural
transformation towards increasingly
participatory and decentralised
mechanisms of decision-making and
activity, although there are significant
differences between them.
The first was the project to set up the
International Exhibition of Architecture
and Building (IBA) at Emscher Park, an
ambitious contribution to the region's
spatial redevelopment. Innovatively
conceived as a competition for design
ideas decided by juries with representatives
from State and local authorities, industry,
u iversities and the general public, the
initiative has been co-ordinated by a
private company, Emscher Park GmbH,
which is 100%-owned by the government
of NRW but fully autonomous. It is based
in Gelsenkirchen and run on commercial
lines by a staff of 25 (broadly recognised
as highly competent) with an operating
budget worth DM 35 million.
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By 1999, the date originally set for
terminating its activities, the IBA had
managed in its ten years of operation to
initiate over one hundred projects with
major impacts on urban design,
architecture, the arts and the economy in
the northern zone of the Ruhr Area, which
accounts for about a third of the region's
territory.
Through the Emscher Park company the
IBA does not provide direct resources for
project investment, but offers vital backing
in tapping complementary sources of
funding from the State, the Federal
government or the European Union. Its
portfolio currently includes 120 projects
adopted to date, including a mega-project
designed to drain and redevelop the region
by rehabilitating the River Emscher,
creating parks and museums in disused
coal mines and industrial wastelands, and
restoring and redeveloping buildings of
particular architectural interest for new
functions such as centres of technology,
the arts or business incubation in emerging
sectors, not to mention a plethora of related
projects. It would have been difficult to
acquire the significant investment sums
now committed to all these ventures
without co-operation between the various
players from the business, political,
research and artistic communities involved
in this initiative.
The second measure was the creation of
the ZIN regions10, which gave birth in
1990 and 1991 to Regional Conferences.
These were based on the Initiatives for the
Future of the Mining Regions (ZIM),
launched in 1987 and extended across
NRW as ZINs by a State government
decision two years later.
                                         
10 ZIN: "Initiative for the Future of NRW"
 There are now 15 Regional Conferences in
NRW, six of them making up the Ruhr
Area. In most cases their boundaries reflect
e geographical structure of the Chambers
of Industry and Commerce (IHK).11
 
 T e Regional Conferences (RCs) were
devised as forums for territorial
development and social dialogue at district
and municipal level. In order to set them
up, the State government, through its
Ministry of Economic Affairs, called upon
the "relevant social players" in each ZIN
region to agree upon "regional
development strategies". Although the
remit of RCs is closely linked to the
dynamics of meso-economic processes and
decentralisation, their function as
"li chpins" between different and often
divergent local interests, combined with
the fact that decision-making powers are
vested in the State level and with a limited
capacity for resolving conflicts, has in
some cases weakened their authority as a
public force.12
 
 I  is interesting to note that not all the
Conferences have achieved the same
degree of authority and impact within their
community in relation to the original aims
and expectations. In general terms, some
Conferences have a reputation for being
very effective (such as Westfalen–Lippe
and Aachen), others have evolved from
their original form into a new structure
(Emscher–Lippe), while others again have
achieved little or are at least rated very
differently by the players involved (usually
se are based in regions with a distinctive
"centre/periphery" pattern)13.
                                         
11 Cf. Fürst, D. (1999).
12 Fürst and Kilper (1995).
13 Portratz, W. (1997) supplies an excellent
framework for analysis and a number of
comparative aspects of the operation and scope
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 One personal impression which the author
has gained from various visits and a
number of interviews with industrial
payers is that, regardless of their
assessment by the organisers themselves in
each region, the RCs have not yet
established a firm, clear image among the
local business community, especially
entrepreneurs, when it comes to their
potential achievements and actual
relevance. My first hypothesis for
explaining this "fuzzy picture" is that a
certain bureaucratisation may have
occurred within these frameworks,
although we should not forget that the
Conferences are convened around the
meso-regional level, which does not
necessarily require them to be
acknowledged by players at the
microeconomic level. One way to assess
the true impact of the Regional
Conferences at this level would be to
survey the awareness and opinions of these
actors with regard to specific measures
initiated by the RCs.
                                                       
of different regional conferences in NRW up to
the first half of the 1990s.
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After a decade of operation it is fair to state that both the RCs and the IBA are clear expressions that State
government structural policy has evolved towards opening up frameworks for involving society's various
actors in debating and prioritising projects and proposals while at the same time promoting dynamic
decentralisation mechanisms for implementing policies of structural transformation.
Apart from concluding that these two measures grew over the nineties to become significant mechanisms in
the structural transformation process at regional level, it would seem useful to mention some similarities and
dissimilarities between them, with a view to identifying guiding threads for the operation and regulation of
future measures which seek, like these, to involve a number of players in diverse territorial frameworks for
action.
Perhaps the first similarity between the RCs and the IBA is the matrix which they provide for interaction
between the different tiers of public administration (Federal, State, local) and other relevant players in each
territory. Both measures were initiated at State government level in the conceptual phase, and autonomous
bodies at this State level have played an active role, assuming operational responsibility, encouraging the
participation of a wide range of players in the processes concerned, and setting up regular dialogue with the
State level.
One major difference derives from the nature of decisions taken in these two environments. Whereas
different bodies require co-ordination within the IBA in order to thrash out possible support for clearly
demarcated projects, the RCs attempt to create consensus around regional development strategies and then
convert this into priorities for action which can be very different in kind. Obviously potential conflicts may
turn out to be far more complex in the case of the RCs because they are more abstract by nature. Moreover,
the pluralist, round-table nature of the RCs imposes clear limits on their ability to resolve conflicts. In the
case of the IBA, interaction with the State level is channelled through the Emscher Park company by means
of processes and talks which are regular enough to generate a certain systematic approach over time. In the
case of RCs, the formal channel to the State is the regional commission, usually with a remit for several RCs.
Nevertheless, due to the diversity of substance matter and often fragile consensus, a number of secondary
communication channels exist based on relationships between different social networks and the State.
The need to seek consensus between different players tends to introduce an anti-innovation touch to
agreements generated at the RCs, by contrast with the IBA's explicit commitment to innovative projects.
Another difference between the two concerns the evolution of mechanisms for dialogue and consultation: in
the case of the RCs these are more or less fixed structures which are able to reflect "relevant regional
forces"14; at the IBA, on the other hand, structures are temporary and respond to a logic of flexible geometry
which depends on the nature and location of each project.
Summing up, although both measures are part of deliberate efforts at State level to strengthen territorial
networks of players within the dynamics of structural transformation in NRW, given differences in their
competence and in the nature of the decisions they confront it does not seem appropriate to set up models for
comparing their performance.
That being said, in the specific case of certain RCs which commonly experience difficulties in resolving
conflicts – by nature usually more complex ones – and adopting innovative visions, a need arises to
complement the role played by the State and local authorities in managing and settling these conflicts, and
also to foster comparative feedback from the RCs to provide incentives for overcoming conflicts and promote
greater exchange of methods and practice, drawing especially on the experience of more successful and
advanced RCs (which have achieved more dynamic integration and more visible progress on the regional
development strategies around which they managed to build consensus) in order to assist those which have
tended to stagnate or which have not asserted much authority locally. It should be recalled that the RCs were
originally set up by the State government as learning processes, both for the regions, in bringing together the
players, identifying regional needs and initiating a concrete response, and for the State as the catalyst and
engineer of decentralised mechanisms towards a strategy for structural transformation.
                                         
14 Noll and Scharfenorth, 1997.
17 CLAUDIO MAGGI
3.2 Promoting institutionalised
support for NRW's new
competitive  profile
 One principal feature of the strategy
adopted by the State and local authorities
in order to promote investment and
reactivate the regional economy was the
technological profile created around
sectors identified as keys to future
development. The intention was to convey
an image of industrial renewal and
modernisation both at home and further
afield. The region's industrial past had
endowed it with a well-knit infrastructure
of roads, rail and inland waterways.
Besides, its relatively central position
within Europe and the well-considered
concentration of universities and centres of
research, development and technology
transfer in the area helped to sustain a pro-
enterprise strategy attracting new business
with a high technology content, be it in
conventional fields of manufacturing and
industrial services or in the new,
knowledge-driven industries.
 
 In the last two decades these new sectors
have taken a strong hold, partly as a result
of local conditions (location factors, local
demand, basic services, specific
incentives15), and partly due to the trends
and opportunities presented by highly
globalised markets. Among the highest
growth sectors (in terms of number of
companies) in the region over the last 15
years we find environmental technologies
and services, biotechnology, alternative
energies, telecommunications, information
 
                                         
15 One example is the start-up campaign called GO
("Grundungs-Offensive") launched by the
regional administration in 1997.
 technology, and audiovisual/multimedia
activities.
 
 It is, however, the longer established
industries in the region, such as chemicals,
car manufacturing, electronics and
engineering, which still account for 40% of
NRW's industrial product and about 50%
of exports from the state, although they are
now far more complex and technologically
ynamic.16
 
 One interesting feature of new business in
the region is its tendency to concentrate in
t ritorial clusters, motivated either by the
presence of strategic clients (like the State
Development Agency in the case of the
environment industry, or television
broadcasting in the case of the audiovisual
production companies around Cologne), or
by major support provided by local
administrations and institutions in order to
attract companies to settle, with the help of
State-backed measures such as industrial
parks or business incubation centres.17
Certainly, this functional differentiation
within the territory of NRW had already
been evident in the coal and steel cluster
which developed in the Ruhr Area, driven
by the needs of the big companies of
yesteryear, and recently a similar
phenomenon has been observed among
parts suppliers for the car industry.18
 
 One key element in the process of
industrial restructuring undergone by
NRW has been the creation, since the late
                                         
16 Data provided by the State Statistics Office of
NRW, 1995 and 1998.
17 One example of an industrial park is the
Chemsite set up by the Emscher-Lippe Agency,
while the many incubation centres offer "start-
up packages", similar to the State GO campaign
mentioned above.
18 On this cf. Kilper, H., Latniak et al. (1994), ch.2.
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1960s, of a large number of institutions
devoted to development, the promotion of
industry and technology transfer. They can
be found throughout the state, but they are
a little more concentrated in the Aachen
and Ruhr areas. There is no doubt that a
critical mass of services in support of
business development, innovation and
technology transfer has taken shape over
the last thirty years as a deliberate feature
of the industrial and technology policies
pursued by the government of NRW.
 
 NRW now has more institutions serving
the productive sector than any other state
in Germany. In 1996, for example, there
were 119 Gründerzentren19 in the whole
of Germany, including the new states. Of
these, NRW boasted the greatest number
(35), followed by Baden-Württemberg
with 17.
 
 Most of these bodies were set up as private
companies from public resources, in other
words as public-private initiatives or PPPs
(public-private partnerships). Public
funding usually accounts for the bulk of
financing during the construction or
preparatory phase and the initial phase of
operation. It is then reduced to cover at
most 50% of operating costs, the rest being
financed from revenues obtained by the
sale of services.
 
 Apart from the above-mentioned
Gründerzentren, the following institutions,
dispersed across the state, had been
established by the early 1990s:20
                                         
19 Incubation and service centres for start-ups,
usually with a technological character, source:
Behrendt (1996), in Sternberg, Behrendt et al.
(1996).
20Data from WMTM, NRW (1992). This does not
include the 35 incubation centres, some of
which are linked to technology centres.
· 49 consultancy and technology transfer
points under the wing of universities,
polytechnics, chambers of industry and
trade unions;
· 29 R&D centres staffed by scientists;
· 26 technology transfer centres;
· 45 generic or specialised technology
centres;
· Centres for innovation and technology
consulting services (ZENIT in
Mülheim, GIB in Bottrop, etc.)
 
 Usually the initial investment required to
set up these centres would be provided for
he most part by public and private players
at local level, that is, the district or
municipality where the centre is based, the
local savings bank (Sparkasse) and the
local Chamber of Industry and Commerce
(IHK). Occasionally there might be some
input from the State or the European Union
(via special funds for backward regions or
those in the process of industrial
r structuring).21
 
 Whereas the investment structure is
predominantly local, the operational
funding for the great majority of these
institutions usually includes public input
from up to five different tiers: local,
re ional, State, Federal and European
Community. The State Ministry of
Economic Affairs, therefore, has
established mechanisms for regular
communication between the local, State
and Federal levels to avoid duplication in
the allocation of resources.
 
                                         
21 By way of example, the Technologie-Zentrum
(TZ) in Dortmund was set up using funds from
local government (City of Dortmund), 46.5%;
local Chambers, 16%; the regional savings
bank and other local banks, 25%; and a local
private-law company founded specifically to
implement and manage the TZ, 12.5%.
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 According to figures from the Ministry of
Economic Affairs in NRW, the State
government made direct allocations worth
DM 3,100 million to promoting industry in
the period 1994-1999. Of this, 65% was
spent through regular development
programmes, 27% through programmes to
generate employment, and 8% on other
programmes. The aim for the period 2000-
2006 is to increase the nominal budget by
about 10%, but to restrict the share of
regular development programmes to 55%
of these resources in order to devote a
greater proportion (about 43%) to creating
jobs (preliminary estimates).22
 
 For the purpose of promoting industry
NRW has its own Economic Development
Agency, the GfW des Landes NRW, which
depends directly on the State government
for its funding but has a company-type
structure.23 This Agency co-ordinates a
whole range of programmes aimed at
economic development and stimulating
investment, and its network of offices
includes representatives abroad.
Nevertheless, at district level and in the
bigger towns there are also economic
development companies which not only
co-ordinate the activities of the State GfW
at local level, but also play an active part in
the RCs and initiate their own development
measures.
                                         
22 This information was provided by Dr. H. Jakoby
at the seminar "Die Neuausrichtung der
Strukturfonds und ihre Bedeutung für die
Strukturpolitik in NRW", Dortmund, August
1999.
23 GfW: Gesellschaft für Wirtschaftsförderung
GmbH.
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 In addition to the impressive number of institutions in existence, it is interesting to note that the State
government frequently refers to an "institutional network" geared to technological development. Based on
visits I have been able to make so far, it does seem that there are many institutions and that, broadly speaking,
they display a high level of technical and professional qualifications, attractive project portfolios and
diversified funding structures which draw on various sources of public money combined with payment for
services to private companies. Nevertheless, there does not appear to be much sign of systematic interplay
between these institutions, even when working on projects similar in content and reach. This observation
raises the question of possible redundancies within the region's meso-framework.
 
 Reviewing the allocation of public resources, one might argue that redundancies of this kind entail a degree
of cost structure inefficiency in the region's efforts to promote industry and technology. On the other hand, if
we take on board less orthodox considerations, such as imperfect information in technology markets, or the
risk inherent in any innovation and R&D commitment, the fact that more than one player is carrying out pre-
competitive work within the same field emerges, rather, as an advantage, because it boosts the odds of
success for at least one project in a given field over the region as a whole.
 
 Then again, geographical proximity, the informal links which exist and the forums for social and economic
exchange (such as Regional Conferences) enable players at meso-level who are engaged in tasks involving a
certain redundancy to maintain regular contact, even if they do not co-ordinate their activities formally, and
this hinders the evolution of stagnant compartmentalisation. These links and periodic forums of encounter
help to generate momentum and interaction at meso-level of the kind experienced in institutionalised
networks, free of the exclusive moulds which characterise the market and hierarchical organisations.
 
 Perhaps the biggest question-mark with regard to the wealth of actors in NRW's meso-economy concerns
their real market performance. At present, the many incentives, grants and institutional demand which come
from the public sector, and in particular the State government, have been key factors in their foundation and
operation. However, what would happen if these incentives were to vanish dramatically, which is likely to
happen in the medium term following the principle that industrial policies are transient affairs? Is there now
enough private demand to absorb this supply of pre-competitive services? If there is no market for pre-
competitive services, what can be done to discourage institutional self-reference on the supply side? What
competitive elements (incentives, penalties, indications of demand) would stimulate processes of cost and
quality optimisation for these services?
 
 
 
3.3 The "meso" map
The State of North Rhine–Westphalia is a
perfect example of Germany's
administrative and institutional structures
including, for example, their considerable
decentralisation. In pursuing industrial and
technological promotion policies, public
administration juggles with various
decision-making tiers involved in the
allocation of resources, from local
authorities to the supranational organisms
of the European Community. This
necessitates channels of communication
and co-ordination between the bodies
concerned. By the same token,
institutionalised support mechanisms are
territorially dispersed.
There are two potential explanations for
the decentralisation of NRW's meso-
framework, and probably they complement
one another. The first relates to the active
process of decentralising public
administration, which has been
consolidated in recent years by reforms
transferring tasks and responsibilities down
to sub-regional and local levels
(Kommunalverband, Kreis and
Stadtverwaltung). Combined with a long
tradition of institutional decentralisation in
Germany, characteristically reflected in
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Regional Associations (Landschafts-
verband) and regional Chambers of
Industry and Commerce (IHK) and Savings
Banks (Sparkasse), the logical
consequence has been for bodies arising
from public-private initiatives to adopt a
similar pattern of territorial dispersion.
The second hypothesis indicates a less
deliberate process of devolution from the
"centre" (in this instance the State
government) to the "periphery" (local
authorities), in that the former takes on the
role of engineering policies and driving
strategies, which can only be implemented
with the support of meso-territorial players
with a functional or sectoral focus, leaving
it to channel more human resources
towards negotiation with the Federal and
European levels.
Within this meso-framework we must
distinguish between, on the one hand,
institutions with a local or regional scope,
which inevitably are territorially dispersed
and, on the other, bodies with a State or
even Federal remit based in different cities
as an expression of the region's
polynuclear demographic structure. The
first category includes the local economic
development agencies, such as Emscher
Lippe Agentur or Duisburg's GfW
(Gesellschaft für Wirtschaftsförderung
mbH), but also incubation centres for start-
ups or technology transfer and
development centres such as the
environmentally-oriented TZU
(Technologiezentrum Umweltschutz) in
Oberhausen or the TZ (Technologie
Zentrum) in Dortmund, and, in the other
sub-category, the Chambers of Industry
and Commerce (IHK) and trade unions
(Gewerkschaft). In the second category we
might, by way of example, single out such
institutions as ZENIT (the Zentrum für
Innovation und Technik dedicated to
innovation technology in NRW), GIB (the
Gesellschaft für innovative Beschäf-
tigungsförderung which seeks to generate
employment in innovative sectors) or the
ILS (the Institut für Landes- und
Stadtentwicklungsforschung des Landes
NRW, engaged in research for town and
country planning), all of which pursue
state-wide objectives, but also Federal
institutions of research such as the
Forschungszentrum Jülich, the Max Planck
institutes (10 in NRW, 3 of which in the
Ruhr Area) and the Fraunhofer institutes
(5 in NRW, 2 in the Ruhr).
NRW's meso-framework consists of so
many disparate institutions that any serious
attempt to analyse the role they play and to
set up benchmarks for assessing their
performance, perhaps as a guide to the
allocation of resources, would need first of
all to establish a typology based on at least
three features: 1. organisational form
(public, PPP, private, profit-making or
n t); 2. territorial reach (local, i.e.
municipality or district, regional, State,
national) and 3. mission statement and core
competences (basic research, R&D,
consultancy for businesses or institutions,
specific business services such as
incubation, technological surveys,
technology transfer, etc.).
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The following table illustrates some features of this basic typology:
Organisational form
Territorial reach
Public Public Private – P.ship
(PPP)
Private
Federal/national Basic research, R&D:
Max Planck GmbH
(10); Fraunhofer GmbH
(5);
BFZ Jülich
Definition and
regulation of policy
programmes:
Federal government
Advocacy:
Federation of Chambers
Trade union federation
Financial services:
Private bank
Applied research,
business consulting:
ISA Consult GmbH
State Definition, initiation
and regulation of
policy programmes:
State government
Policy promotion and
coordination:
GfW NRW GmbH
Zentralbank NRW
Applied research,
business consulting:
IAT Gelsenkirchen
ILS Dortmund
Wuppertal Institut
LEG
Applied research,
business consulting:
GIB Bottrop
ZENIT Mülheim
Advocacy:
State Fed. Of Chambers
State trade union fed.
Financial services:
Private bank
Applied research,
business consulting:
Agipla Consult GmbH
Regional Policy promotion and
coordination.:
Landschaftsverbände R-
W
Regierungsbezirk
Ruhr Association of
Local Authorities
(KVR);
Initiation,
coordination and
prioritisation:
Regional Conferences;
Emscher-Lippe Agency
(ELA);  IBA; Chemsite
Advocacy:
Associations of private
bodies
Local Policy promotion and
coordination.:
District/municipal
authority
Basic research, R&D:
Universities
Coordination and
service provision:
City`s Economic
development Agencies;
TZ and Gründerzentren
(approx. 150)
Financial services:
Sparkasse
Advocacy and service
provision:
Chamber of Industry
and Commerce
Trade union
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In terms of regional administration, we
must distinguish between at least six
different structures in NRW which have
territorial powers positioned somewhere
between State and local level. These
structures, which may in cases overlap
either each other's sphere of competence or
those of other administrative tiers24, are as
follows:
a) Regional associations (Landschafts-
verband Rheinland and Westfalen-
Lippe): These two organisms have
historical roots dating back to the
Associations of Prussian Provinces,
which survived until the Second World
War. After the war they continued to
function as "natural" frameworks for
local authorities to present their case
within regional planning processes.
They maintained this implicit role until
the 1970s, when the new unitary
administrations were formed. Today
their primary task is to distribute social
benefits and to exercise specific duties
such as road construction, health
provision and the organisation of
regional arts activities. In 1998 the two
Associations had an aggregate social
assistance budget worth approximately
DM 7,000 million.
b) Regierungsbezirk: In administrative
terms, this is the main division in
NRW. The state breaks down into 5
Regierungsbezirke: Düsseldorf
(consisting of 15 districts or Kreise, 11
of them urban); Cologne (12 districts, 4
urban); Münster (8 districts, 3 urban);
Detmold (6 districts, 1 urban), and
Arnsberg (12 districts, 5 urban). The
Ruhr Area straddles three of these
unitary administrations: Dusseldorf,
Arnsberg and Münster. Since 1976
                                         
24 Based on Blotevogel, H. (1998)
these have been the "official" units of
regional planning. To this end they
each have a Legislative Council
consisting of representatives from local
councils.
c) Ruhr Association of Local Authorities
(Kommunalverband Ruhrgebiet–KVR):
This is an alliance of local authorities
found exclusively in the Ruhr Area
which has replaced the former
Association of Coal Communities in
the Ruhr25. The KVR is the largest and
oldest association (Verband) of this
type in Germany, and it possesses
broad powers and functions. In 1998
the KVR had a staff of over 350
professional experts and administrative
employees with information tasks in
various fields (transport, tourism,
structural planning, public
administration, services to local
citizens, arts and recreation, and
others), or else engaged in projects in
these fields, such as designing routes
for cultural tourism, improving public
services, helping to network regional
public transport or supporting
particular target populations such as
women in business, young people, etc.
The State government is contemplating
a new status for this body in the near
future. As the "Ruhr Agency" it would
focus more effectively on strategic
development projects for the region
and would absorb the present executive
office of the IBA.
d) Regional Conferences: A  part of the
Initiative for the Future of NRW (ZIN),
14 ZIN Regions were defined in 1989.
These were groups of Kreise perceived
as sharing certain interests and
challenges. Each Regierungsbezirk was
subdivided into at least 2 and at most 5
                                         
25 Siedlungsverband Ruhrkohlenbezirk
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ZIN Regions. The only exception was
Ostwestfalen-Lippe, where the ZIN
Region is congruent with the
Regierungsbezirk. In 1990, the State
government granted these entities
official status and increased the number
to 15. They were given the task of
organising Regional Conferences and
elaborating strategies for "regional
development".
 The conference cartography is as follows:
Regierungsbezirk Regional Conference (no. of Kreise)
Dusseldorf Bergische Grossstädte (3)
Dusseldorf / Mittlerer Niederrhein (6)
Mülheim / Essen / Oberhausen (3*)
Niederrhein (3*)
Cologne Aachen (5)
Bonn (2)
Cologne (5)
Münster Emscher – Lippe (3*)
Münsterland (5)
Detmold Ostwestfalen – Lippe (7)
Arnsberg Arnsberg (2)
Dortmund / Unna / Hamm (3*)
Mittleres Ruhrgebiet / Bochum (3*)
Hagen (3*)
Siegen (2)
Source: Compiled from data in Heinze and Voelzkow (eds.) 1997
 ( * ) : Indicates that part of the territory falls within the Ruhr Area
Although some criticisms could be
levelled at the achievements of these
various Regional Conferences and at
the way they represent regional
interests or organise participation (as
an earlier section has described), there
is no doubt that since their foundation
they have provided a framework for
strategic deliberation and dialogue
within their territories, permitting local
authorities to co-operate and sending
out feelers between local, regional and
State representatives. All in all, this
has enriched the institutional meso-
fabric in NRW from the perspective of
these "regions" as natural arenas for
enhanced co-ordination between
different measures designed to
promote the economy.
e) Regional secretariats
(Regionalsekretariate): Administrative
units set up to represent state policies
in the field of labour matters and the
employment market.
f) Cultural regions (Kulturregionen): A
subdivision of the state serving the
organisation and promotion of arts-
related measures.
KEY FACTORS OF STRCTURAL CHANGE IN NORTH RHINE WESTPHALIA 25
It is evident from this brief description of regional structures in NRW that very different
subdivisions are at play, and that a region with such a strong historical, cultural and
economic identity as the Ruhr Area is nevertheless fragmented across diverse entities at this
level, except in the case of the KVR.
At the same time, we must distinguish between functioning structures (Regierungsbezirk,
Landschaftsverband, KVR) with a corporate profile of their own, which can take decisions
and implement measures without first achieving consensus between various players, and
bodies devoted to specific purposes but without a permanent institutional structure, which
require this consensus in order to adopt decisions (Regional Conferences, IBA). It is worth
considering what might happen if certain tasks were transferred from one type of body to the
other (for example, a second phase of the IBA under the aegis of the KVR).
The obvious superimposition of different structures, which can be explained in historical and
political terms, generates high transaction costs in the field of policy co-ordination and co-
operation between authorities with, moreover, different territorial boundaries.
From the public management perspective, the most appropriate question is probably: How
can this institutional conglomeration be knitted together in a manner which enhances co-
ordination and interplay with a view to creating synergies and preventing the fragmentation
of effort or the duplication of tasks among bodies with different territories and scopes?
Again, it is the State which assumes responsibility for facilitating interaction and ongoing
co-operation, ensuring some regulation and governance for network dynamics.
3.4 Opportunities and threats
created by the new European
scenario
As integration of the European Union
proceeds, it brings in its wake a number of
changes in the economic and techno-
productive environment of member states
and regions. This phenomenon, often
referred to as "Europeanisation", opens up
new options with various implications for
location factors, trading relations, the
integration of manufacturing and services,
technology, labour, institutions – to
mention only some of the more salient
aspects. For the regions concerned, these
options may present opportunities, but also
threats, depending on their relative
strengths and weaknesses and on the
ability of regional players to recognise and
seize opportunities before – or together
with – other regions.
Drawing on Porter's competitive
diamond26, we can deduce that the new
European scenario will affect the
conditions for competition and co-
operation between companies, the
conditions governing components in and,
therefore, the overall pattern of many value
added chains, and also the institutional
context, reinforcing the supranational plane
in the meso-universe within which each
economic player operates.
Within this new scenario NRW clearly
boasts a number of advantages due to its
geographical location, its infrastructure and
the presence of companies who are "global
players", or at least "European players".
                                         
26 Cf. Porter (1999)
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NRW's central location within the EU27 is
a key aspect, although certainly not the
only one, within this scenario of integrated
national markets. The Rhine-Ruhr axis
from Cologne to Dortmund has Europe's
third greatest concentration of Top 500
company headquarters (as a percentage of
all productive companies) following the
London and Paris regions. Its strengths in
the fields of infrastructure, transport and
communications, and its proximity to the
Netherlands as Europe's leading
distribution centre, promise tremendous
potential within the new scenario for
integrating and developing services to
support the commercial sector, not a
traditional strength of this region.28
With regard to the European institutions
for economic development, NRW has set
up its own specific channels of dialogue
over the years, taking advantage of its
critical mass of institutions and backed by
the State government, which has made a
priority of such efforts. Another strength
which NRW has cultivated efficiently,
therefore, is the relative autonomy which
federal states in Germany have, compared
with other member states, to establish their
own links with the supranational, European
tier.29
One interesting example of horizontal co-
operation between regions in the present
European scenario is Euregio, a territorial
entity constituted by the regions Aachen,
Maastricht (Netherlands) and Liège
(Belgium) where institutions co-operate in
the fields of R&D, technology and
                                         
27 At present 40% of the EU's population live
within a radius of 300 miles from the capital of
NRW, Dusseldorf.
28 Cf. De Ligt, T. and Wever, E. (1998)
29 Cf. Meise, T. (1997), ch. 3.2
company exchange in order to boost
competitive advantages in particular high
a ded-value, high technology sectors such
as telecommunications, car manufacturing
processes, biotechnology and bio-
engineering.
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It is interesting to note that the competitive prospects for companies in NRW within this European scenario
are not equally shared throughout the state. Some areas, such as the districts of Aachen, Cologne,
Dusseldorf, Dortmund, Essen and Detmold, have a well-advanced product and service nucleus and, in
addition, are perceived as attractive locations for potential new companies. Others, including much of the
Ruhr Area, seem well on the way to creating a profile of this kind, but have not yet shaken off their long-
established image based on mining and heavy industry, in spite of the indisputable gains made in new
sectors and the remaining potential. That is why initiatives to enhance and update the regional image, such
as the spatial redevelopment undertaken by the IBA, are more far-reaching in impact than might be
suggested by their direct achievements in the field or architecture and urban design. In fact, their economic
impact cannot be evaluated in such direct terms as the number of jobs created. In this instance, it would
seem more appropriate to apply contingent evaluation methods (i.e. to evaluate scenarios in which these
projects do not feature, and contrast the findings with ex-post evidence of the projects). This would help to
paint some picture of indirect effects, such as decisions to locate, investment and the preservation or
creation of jobs.
Similarly, the incubation centres and the GO initiative cannot be reduced to direct effects, but have also
enhanced communication and, in no small way, image.
In this context, the contribution made by the Regional Conferences is not so assured, especially when they
tend to represent the traditionally dominant players in their territories. On the other hand, if they gear their
structure and content more closely to region's future potential and opportunities, displaying enough
flexibility to involve emerging players in this dynamic process, they may establish a role as key meso-
economic players able to stimulate synergies between the inputs and priorities of European, Federal and
State bodies in the interests of the region.
4. The strategy today: A "new
agenda" for the State
government?
4.1 Systematised impressions:
constituent factors in the
NRW experience
There are three constituent factors which
help to understand NRW's experience of
structural transformation and to venture
some analysis of its future evolution and
the hurdles it will need to surmount. The
first concerns the magnitude of the
industrial challenge. Vast areas of the state
are affected. Their populations and socio-
cultural patterns developed hand in glove
with the consolidation of highly
competitive industrial conglomerations in
the international arena which, if we cannot
entirely classify them as mono-productive,
nevertheless revolved around a hegemonic
cluster: coal–energy–steel–metalworking–
heavy chemicals. Radical changes on both
the supply and demand side deprived this
cluster of viability within less than twenty
years, necessitating transformation towards
a socio-productive weave which echoed
these earlier conditions but which was no
match for a challenge of this magnitude.
This factor is of major relevance in that it
reveals how strengths in an environment of
continuity and marginal change can
become weaknesses against a backdrop of
radical transformation, due to the inertia
which a network or social system tends to
display, and given the uncertainties and
risks which this challenge initially
presents. That is why the strategy for
change initiated by the State government
had to reflect the magnitude of that
challenge, in order to overcome the
established inertia and seek as a priority to
attract new economic players through
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whom industrial restructuring could be
linked to new job opportunities and
dynamic socio-productive trends.
The second constituent factor relates to the
type of leadership which evolved around
the industrial restructuring process, notably
on the part of the State government. The
NRW experience illustrates a clear
decision by the State to provide strategic
direction for this transformation (primarily
through the State government itself, but
flanked by the Federal, local and, more
recently, supranational tiers), given the
relative retreat of several
companies/consortia which had previously
operated as natural and hegemonic leaders
in NRW's principal industrial
agglomerations. Direction was provided by
means of three strategy components:
1) the progressive allocation of resources
for "structural change" by means of
(usually indirect) subsidies intended to
stimulate new jobs in various ways: by
attracting business, encouraging start-
ups, improving the provision of pre-
competitive services, supporting
innovation and exports and, more
recently, promoting clustering and
closer links between productive
companies;30
2) participatory assemblies created from
the late 1980s with a view to
formulating shared visions of the future
(ZIM, ZIN and subsequently Regional
Conferences) and providing orientation
for regional and local action; and
3) an information strategy targeted at
citizens and above all relevant
                                         
30 From 1990 to 1998 State spending targeted at
structural transformation grew to overtake
direct subsidies to the coal industry, reversing
the trend observed between 1982 and 1989
(source: IAT, 1998).
economic and institutional players,
combined with high-impact projects
aimed at enhancing the state's image
(IBA).
Without wishing to play down the role of
market variables, which in no uncertain
terms triggered the need for industrial
conversion, I would maintain that the State
overnment exercised an indisputable
leadership function in structural
transformation which clearly evolved over
time: its earliest measures were more
interventionist and centralised in character
(including the strategy of the State
Development Agency, or LEG, in the late
1970s, during the first phase of
Standortpolitik), followed by the deliberate
promotion of participatory arenas for
strategic planning (Future Initiative for the
Ruhr, ZIM, ZIN, Regional Conferences,
tc.) with growing decentralisation. At the
same time programmes were set up to
encourage regular communication and
interplay between players at different
decision-making levels (IBA, GO, sectoral
initiatives for energy, telecommunications,
car suppliers, biotechnology), while PPP
models were applied to found or reinforce
a wide range of autonomous institutions at
regional and local level within the meso-
economic framework.
A third constituent element in the
structural conversion of NRW's industry
has been determined by the prevailing
environment, and in particular two
phenomena: globalisation and
Europeanisation. The former has been
displaying increased momentum since the
1980s and affects every company, region
and country. Some aspects of this process
have been reinforced by the increased
flexibility of production technologies,
dovetailed with a trend towards greater
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specialisation – hence the term "flexible
specialisation". A second feature is the
unprecedented proliferation of "global
mercantile chains“31. In a context of
increasingly unregulated capital flows,
these two trends are generating a series of
impacts at local and global level, and
NRW is no exception. Europeanisation has
injected further conditions which
complement those of globalisation,
opening up a number of options for
Europe's regions which will present
opportunities or threats, depending on their
strengths, weaknesses and strategies, as
manufacturing and service structures
attune to the competition. NRW offers an
uneven panorama in this respect, as there
are some regions within the state with
functional profiles which fit the European
scenario (Aachen, Cologne, Detmold) and
others which have not defined their profile
to the same degree (Düren, parts of the
Ruhr Area).
                                         
31 Cf. Dussel, E. (1999)
4.2 The evolving role of State
government
Ongoing momentum in the formation of
new meso-players, creating new
redundancies and complementarities, the
clear trend towards decentralisation of
public administration and industrial policy
mechanisms, and the acknowledgement of
powers vested in the local tier
(municipalities and districts) are all factors
which, among others, have gradually
shifted the emphasis in the role played by
the State government within its strategy for
industrial restructuring, beginning as
executive administrator (in the initial phase
of Standortpolitik), then acting as
developer and distributor of resources
(Gründerzentren, TZ), and more recently
as a partner in dialogue with the ability to
co-ordinate a complex network while
dispersing strategic (not merely
operational) policy-making capacities and
responsibilities across its territory.
Certainly, the State has consciously opted
over the last ten years for this network
logic rather than a laissez faire approach or
a strategy based on centralised planning
hierarchies32. This logic has drawn
momentum from the Regional Conferences
and measures encouraging broader
participation in territorial redevelopment,
like the IBA. Today, alongside the three
constituent factors already described, the
meso-economic framework is marked by
an abundance of players displaying open
task and role redundancies and by a strong
and growing degree of functional and
operational devolution down to regional
and local bodies. This has been facilitated
by the considerable professional and
                                         
32 Cf. Messner (1997), ch. 1.4 and III.2
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technical capacity at the base of the
existing institutional pyramid (Chambers,
trade unions, local authorities),
subsequently reinforced by new players
(meso-institutions, local development
agencies) and by the provision of resources
for allocation and deployment at this level.
Nevertheless, the evolution of this huge
meso-economic network raises a number
of questions which are crucial to assessing
recent performance and determining the
next steps: What role should the state
government assume following its "meso-
activating" function in the development of
this network? What should be done to
facilitate and regulate interaction within
the network between the various territorial
levels? What more can be done to develop
high-quality, cost-efficient support to
businesses and management? Is there a
danger that institutions become self-
legitimating? Are incentives and
"penalties" required to stimulate market-
type competition within the network?
These questions suggest that it might be
appropriate for the State government to
adopt a new "post-activating" role. Its
emphasis would be, first, to develop
governance capacities by means of
functions such as monitoring, impact
assessment and incentive engineering and
by promoting efficient channels for
communication and feedback through the
network and, second, to strengthen the
network's capacity for external dialogue,
that is, with the Federal, European and
international levels.
Governance is by no means a trivial affair
in complex networks. It is difficult to
isolate the effects or results of specific
policies and measures by means of
monitoring and evaluation when myriad
players are interacting with companies
directly and indirectly, and when there are
simultaneously exogenous factors
influencing the competitive environment.
Much the same applies to investment
d cisions. The performance of even a
single company, organisation, industrial
subsector or location is determined by
multiple factors and dynamic processes
which cannot easily be slotted into a linear
scheme of case and effect.
The patent complexity of assessing
performance in the meso-context and
evaluating the efficiency of instruments
inevitably infects the design of incentives,
which calls for a delicate balance between
specific relevance and clarity of indicators.
Tools such as benchmarking and
performance contracts for institutions also
m ke a helpful contribution in the task of
governance, although they need constant
review and updating.
 At institutional or meso-economic level,
institutional redundancies might seem to be
a regional advantage in the light of
possible synergies and the inherent
uncertainties of pre-competitive
development. However, given the volume
 resources injected by the State, Federal
and European levels, more efforts should
be made to monitor the performance and
impact of these institutions in technology
ransfer, dissemination of technology,
support for innovation and pre-competitive
development, as this would permit some
public resources to be re-allocated on the
basis of performance indicators using
systematised benchmarking models.
Designing and implementing such models
for the purpose of verification and
monitoring is generally a highly complex
task, mainly because the indicators defined
do not entirely match the scope or results
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of specific projects and measures, many of
which yield a wide range of by-products,
synergies and indirect effects, or sow seeds
which do not immediately germinate.
Moreover, evaluating and auditing results
is itself subject to pitfalls and inaccuracies.
 
 Given that every institution is engaged in a
multiplicity of tasks and operates in
diverse contexts, it is difficult to adopt one
standard set of indicators to assess all the
institutions on which feedback is
requested. This poses the option of
performance contracts, linked wherever
possible to quantifiable standards, which
could be integrated into benchmarking
systems in such a way that direct
performance indicators are flexible enough
to reflect the nature and specific context of
the activity carried out by each entity
concerned. 33
 
 Finally, there needs to be a consistent
framework for the incentives associated
with this type of system which will
encourage its functional parts to maintain
it, update it and systematically improve it.
 
 In spite of the complexities described, the
application of a few relatively basic
indicators, enabling performance to be
measured and establishing targets for the
range, reach and quality of activities
undertaken by the diverse meso-actors in
the productive and technological fields as a
first step towards benchmarking and
performance contracts, would be an
appropriate advance towards improving the
present channels of feedback in line with
government expectations.
One relevant, critical aspect in the light of
the challenges posed by competitiveness
                                         
33 As a point of reference cf. Sabel, C. (1995)
and sustainability in NRW's new techno-
productive model is the capacity of the
meso-institutions and their public partners
in this dialogue to react by adapting their
offerings to changes in endogenous
conditions and in the competitive
environment of companies. In this respect,
etworks can generate dynamic
mechanisms which actually result in inertia
or place the brake on change. Another
function which it seems appropriate for the
State government to prioritise in defining
its new role is to act as a catalyst for
change and institutional innovation,
onstantly identifying and promoting
" ood practice" within the region and also
elsewhere.
4.3 Notes for a "new agenda"
The industrial restructuring strategy
originally triggered by the State
government and subsequently supported by
 close-knit "meso-economic network" has
so far pursued clear goals, as described in
the previous sections: private investment
as gained momentum and diversified,
new industries in emerging sectors have
en established or attracted to NRW,
social players have been mobilised locally
and regionally to formulate visions of the
future and identify priorities for action,
integrating the energies and capacities
already existent at these levels into the
process of structural change, and there
have been conscious efforts to consolidate
clusters (car components, biotechnology,
multimedia, environmental technologies
and services) by means of supplier
development programmes, institutional
demand, business incubation, location
incentives and other promotion measures.
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Direct public resources of considerable
magnitude have been allocated by the
State, flanked by input from the other tiers,
but this only reflects the huge scale of the
challenge following the crisis which hit the
traditionally dominant industrial and
employment structures in vast areas of the
state. The bulk of these resources,
however, was targeted towards facilitating
a range of promotional measures, firstly to
attract business to the state, and then to
provide pre-competitive services via
support for the creation and deployment of
a network of intermediate bodies, referred
to throughout the present paper as the
meso-economic network.
Nevertheless, although the phases
described have been relatively successful,
many of the structural problems affecting
the regions most closely linked to the
historical coal, iron and steel cluster – such
as high levels of structural unemployment,
low export-related activity and low growth
in emerging sectors, compared with both
the state and the Federal average – have
not yet been definitively overcome, in spite
of the preferential support given to meso-
economic bodies and forums in these
r gions.
Be that as it may, public administration
functions have increasingly been
transferred to regional and local entities, as
described in section 3.4, freeing the State
to concentrate on new fronts determined by
the more recent scenario in which NRW is
externally engaged as a result of
Europeanisation and globalisation and also
by new domestic conditions which the
State's own strategy for structural change
has helped to create.
A preliminary and probably non-
exhaustive attempt to identify components
for a State government agenda in the years
a ead in pursuit of its strategy to
restructure the productive economy should
begin by considering the following aspects:
· Regulation and governance of the meso-economic network. Development of decentralised monitoring
systems, flexible benchmarking systems, transfer of resources based on performance contracts and
development of carrot-and-stick schemes to encourage conduct which will maximise the value for
money of services provided.
· Development and fine-tuning of communication and feedback channels. Development of arbitration
capacity and powers to deal with conflicts, not only at State level; optimisation and de-
bureaucratisation of co-ordination channels between different bodies by integrating new
communication technologies with the support of local industry (intranets, virtual information portals,
IC systems);
· Prioritisation of improved communication with the upper territorial tiers. Efficient transmission of
State and regional priorities (from RCs upwards) to the Federal and European level in order to achieve
the most effective input of subsidiary resources while avoiding a duplication of channels and funds;
promotion of mechanisms for horizontal exchange within networks, identifying and disseminating
good practice in different regions of Europe and promoting arenas for exchanging experience and
institutional training.
· Promotion of operational capacities at the intermediate (regional) level. Modernisation of certain
regional entities (KVR, Regierungsbezirk) to strengthen operational capacities; co-ordination with
Regional Conferences to identify fields of synergy but also fragmentation and task duplication at local
level.
· Shift from a "capacity-building" to a "market-fostering" focus. Gradual move away from direct transfer
to offerings based on incentives to the demand for pre-competitive services; incorporation of "market"
indicators in performance contracts; systematised surveys of demand by means of market research and
focus groups; promotion of institutional best practice to keep abreast of new market orientations and
global trends in competition.
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· Promotion of networking among users of pre-competitive services. Promotion of collective efficiency
and shared learning processes; differentiation between services offered in the meso-economic
framework and services offered by private consultants, with the former able to absorb transaction costs
associated with micro-economic networking.
· Neutrality in the consultancy market. Guarantee of fair competition and equal market access conditions
for private consultancy services and meso-bodies of a PPP format; negative incentives for meso
incursions into routine consultancy and business services provision.
· Definition and monitoring of performance and quality in State management. Inclusion of performance
indicators in State management similar to those defined for meso-economic bodies in their
performance contracts and monitoring systems.
One equally important question in
considering the future tasks of State
government is whether its present internal
structure is conducive to the nature of
leadership which it is called upon to offer.
In essence it does not seem likely that an
organisation structured basically around
vertical co-ordination within various
divisions, with fairly rigid
compartmentalisation on the horizontal
plane, will be able to develop authentic
institutional capabilities when it comes to
network governance.
5. Lessons and future challenges
for NRW; contrasts with the
Chilean experience
This paper identifies a triad of constituent
factors in the transformation process which
NRW has undergone over the last twenty
years: the depth and magnitude of the
transformation challenge, the strategy and
the leadership provided, and the ambient
conditions. These factors have influenced
the main thrust and priorities which largely
explain the successes achieved from a
contingent evaluation perspective or, in
other words, compared with the direction
which the state economy would have taken
in a hypothetical scenario in which market
forces had been left to function freely,
given the structural (social, labour-related
and cultural) characteristics which
prevailed prior to the need for industrial
restructuring which took vast areas of
North Rhine-Westphalia by surprise much
earlier than other regions of Germany.
Compared with economic restructuring
processes elsewhere, such as the Chilean
experience during the same period, this
strategy and the internal dynamics it
unleashed is different in many respects. To
some extent, Chile's path was the very
antithesis of a strategy based on
strengthening the meso-plane as adopted in
NRW.
Chile's export sector, well rooted in the
international arena due to the early opening
and broad deregulation of its markets and
consisting for the most part of products
with a high natural resources content, was
the driving force behind the national
economy for two decades, and in
consequence Chile boasted the fastest
growing economy in Latin America
between 1985 and 1998. This vigorous
xport activity had a number of positive
ffects, including the stimulation of a
dynamic entrepreneurial sector accustomed
to picking up signals from external markets
a d responding to them with supply-side
adjustments, the evolution of a basic
infrastructure and the provision of services
to support the export business, granting the
country a competitive advantage over
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customary Latin American standards, and
the consolidation of back-up measures by
public agencies, which not only
contributed actively to the promotion of
exports, but also exerted a favourable
impact on the exporters' ability to develop
competitive strategies and encouraged the
collective efficiency of this business
sector.
However, it is doubtful whether this model
for growth can be truly incisive and
sustainable when the overall context is
fraught with institutional and social
weaknesses. Chile has tended to develop
competitive enclaves based, what is more,
on advantages of a static nature. A "second
exporting phase" based on dynamic
competitive advantages was recently
announced, but it is not advancing as fast
as hoped. The weakness of intermediate
players at the meso-economic level is
restricting technological development and
innovation towards more dynamic
competitive advantages and improved co-
ordination within the productive sector. In
spite of the resources targeted since the
early nineties at building pre-competitive
capacities, the erosion of this asset which
has taken place since the introduction of
the neo-liberal model has not yet been
reversed. At the same time, the slow pace
of decentralisation, hampered less by a
lack of political will at the centre than by
an objective lack of regional capacity, acts
as an additional brake on the declared aim
of improving the systemic competitiveness,
sustainability and proportionality of Chile's
economy.
The case of NRW illustrates an abundance
of elements which converge in a process of
deep structural transformation. This paper
has attempted to provide a succinct and
generic description of a number of aspects
which, in the author's opinion, exert a
particular influence on this process and
have proved to be determining factors
when we come to take stock of the results,
impacts and unresolved challenges,
gically taking into account the learning
curves of the most significant players and
the evolution of their roles, both of which
are themselves factors in a process of a
complexity which should not be
underestimated.
Before hazarding elements for comparison
with a development model such as Chile's
one must clearly embark on a number of
prior considerations with regard to
differences in the context, such as the
predominant structure of the productive
economy and how it has evolved in recent
decades, the structure of administrative
d centralisation, patterns of wealth
creation and distribution and, logically, the
relative level of economic development at
the point in time when, in the one case, the
neo-liberal model was implemented and, in
the other, the strategy for structural
ransformation was adopted.
Nevertheless, from the perspective of
c mpetitiveness, in the sense of a capacity
for sustainable growth in increasingly
globalised markets, it is most interesting to
note that both itineraries display
indisputable achievements, even though
they might be regarded as "diametrically
opposite" in terms of their present
strengths, weaknesses and future
challenges. In Chile's case, the major
challenge relates to the issue of capacity
building at the meso-economic, micro-
economic and regional or local levels. In
NRW, the task for the future seems to be
associated rather more with accountability
and market fostering at the meso-economic
and regional/local levels.
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ANNEX
Table A1
Milestones in the Structural Change Policy in North Rhine-Westphalia
Name
Starting year
Current status
Main targets/
features
Support
scheme
Ruhr Property Development Fund (administered by the LEG, the State
Development Agency);
1980;
Still operating.
The Fund has acquired more than 150 industrial sites with a total surface areas of
approx. 2,400 hectares to be recovered and re-sold (by 1997 there were app.
1,000 ha. already sold) to industrial, recreational and residential uses.
EU/State: (22,5%); State (Real Estate-, Iron-, Montanregions Future-, and other
Funds: 48%); Fund-revolving (18%); Local/district (10,5%). Estimated global
investment (1980-1997): 2,300 Mio. DM.
Name
Starting year
Current status
Main targets/
features
Support
scheme
Business Incubators (Gründerzentren);
Since 1984, in Dortmund, Aachen and Bonn;
With a strong support of the State government, there are 36 GZ in NR-W (1997);
To promote: the setting up of firms in „areas of the future“, the so-called „spin-
offs“, technology transfer projects; and to cooperate within the framework of
regional and city development.
Estimated total investment in 19 GZ in NR-W: 416 Mio. DM (State subsidy: 302
Mio. DM): Holders of equities: Host city (75% of cases); Banks/building societies
(45%); Chamber of Commerce: (35%).
Name
Starting year
Current status
Main targets/
features
Support
scheme
EU Structural Funds Program (Objective 2);
1989;
End of Phase IV (1997-1999);
To foster the economic restructuring in the State of NR-W. Main tasks (Phases I,
II & III): recovering industrial sites (30% expenditure); Training (17%); Technology
and Start-up Centers (15%); Tech. Innovation (12%); SME Promotion (3%);
EU (25%); NRW State (20%); Local/district (11%); Privates (44%). Operational
Budget Phase III (1994-1996): 2000 Mio. DM
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Name
Starting year
Current status
Main targets/
features
Support
scheme
International Exhibition of Architecture and Building (IBA) at Emscher Park;
1989;
Finished in 1999. The Emscher Park GmbH (created by the State government to
manage the IBA) has been traspassed to KVR (Ruhr Districts Association);
To contribute to the region's spatial redevelopment. Innovatively conceived as a
competition for design ideas decided by juries with representatives from State
and local authorities, industry, universities and the general public, the initiative
has been co-ordinated by a private company, Emscher Park GmbH, which is
100%-owned by the government of NRW but fully autonomous;
Emscher Park GmbH´s operating budget: 35 Mio DM. Investment structure: State
Operational Budget (35%); other EU/State Funds (Real Estate, urban renewal,
others: 40%); Local and private (35%). Estimated Global Investment: 5200 Mio.
DM.
Name
Starting year
Current status
Main targets/
features
Support
scheme
Initiative for the Future of NRW: ZIN Regions and Regional
Conferences(RC);
RCs: 1988 (Emscher-Lippe), 1989 (Ost Westfalen and Niederrhein), based on the
Initiatives for the Future of the Mining Regions (ZIM), launched in 1987;
The ZIN Regions gave birth in 1990 and 1991 to most of Regional Conferences.
There are now 15 Regional Conferences in NRW. In most cases their boundaries
reflect the geographical structure of the Chambers of Industry and Commerce
(IHK);
RCs were devised as forums for territorial development and social dialogue at
district and municipal level;
State government, local and districts administrations.
Name
Starting year
Current status
Main targets/
features
Support
scheme
Emscher-Lippe Agentur (ELA);
1990, by 36 holders societies (18 private companies, 5 chambers of Industry,
Commerce and Handcraft, 1 Bank, 12 City Administrations);
Still operating, with a staff of 11 professionals;
ELA carries on several permanent functions and specific iniciatives in the field of
economic development and promotion of the Region of Emscher-Lippe:
Investment promotion (Chemsite, Sites management, advisory to potential
investors); sectoral iniciatives (real estate, energie, media, etc.); SME advisory;
promotion of a regional network, among others;
Starting capital: 570,000 DM. Operational budget of 476,500 DM in 1998 that
comes from contributions of chambers, cities, banks and private holders.
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Name
Starting year
Current status
Main targets/
features
Support
scheme
Meso-Institutional Activism and Networking;
Second half decade of 80s;
NRW's meso-framework in the field of economic development, consists of
hundreds of different institutions with regard to their: 1. organisational form
(public, PPP, private, profit-making or not), 2. territorial reach (local, i.e.
municipality or district, regional, State, national) and 3. mission statement and
core competences (basic research, R&D, consultancy for business or institutions,
specific services such as incubates, technological surveys, technology transfer,
etc.); At the State´s level, it´s worth mentioning the GfW, Gesellschaft für
Wirtschaftsförderung NRW (State Economic Development Corporation); the GIB,
Gesellschaft für innovative Beschäftigungsförderung (In ovative Employment
Corporation); the IAT, Institut für Arbeit und Technik (Institute for Work and
Technique); the ZENIT, Zentrum für Innovation und Technik NRW (Center for
Innovation and Technique); the LEG Standort und Projecktentwicklung (State
Development Corporation,  for industrial location and projects), and the ILS,
Institut für Landes und Stadtentwicklungsforschung NRW (Institute for Regional
and Urban Development);
At the beginning of the nineties, the goal were to foster such entities, and to put
them closer to the industrial necessities (Industrial Chambers and Unions). Some
years later, the emphasis moved to coordinate their tasks and services, in order
to gain efficiency, relevance and to optimize the state financial contributions to
them;
Most of meso institution combine financement of customers, state government,
and other contributions from the federal, european and local sources.
Name
Starting year
Current status
Main targets/
features
Support
scheme
Sectoral and „Future“ Initiatives;
Decade of 90s;
There are several sectoral initiatives currently going on;
The emphasis depend on the sector to be considered. In automobil (started
1993), textil (s. 1996), chemical (s.1996) and railways, the emphasis is on
suppliers networking, in food processing and steel it is on competitive
adjustments, in capital goods and mining on training, in info-comunications and
biotechnology on innovation and start-up, in agriculture and energy on
ecoefficiency;
The State government convokes and promotes them.
Name
Starting year
Current status
Main targets/
features
Cluster Promotion Iniciative: Project REKON;
1995
In operation.
To promote strategic cooperation plans between enterprises and institutional
partners, in order to gain sinergies, improving the competitiveness of suppliers of
some products or services, which are concentrated in specific locations. It has
operated in sectors like cement, health care services, logistic, textile, funitures,
energy-related firms, etc.
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Support
scheme The State goverment support the basic studies and coaching activities. The
program aims to leverage contributions from industries and institutional partners.
Name
Starting year
Current status
Main targets/
features
Support
scheme
GO! Initiative (Start-up Offensive);
1996
In operation;
To provide a one-step point service in order to advice new and young business in
financial, administrative and managerial matters. The iniciative aims to facilitate
the access for new business to the Program „Gründungs- und
Wachstumsfinanzierung“ which offer Start-up loans, and Equity Capital
Assistance, from DtA (Deutsche Ausgleichsbank) and start-up credits from the
State´s  Investment Bank (IB-NRW). In addition, it provides financial and legal
advisory, and it also promotes business partnerships
The State government is responsible for the design, promotion and
communication strategy. The network of intermediary entities (most of them Local
agencies and Industrial Chambers) provides the one-step services.
Figure A2
Evolution of Unemployment : Deutschland (BRD), NRW and Ruhr Region (KVR)
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Figure A4
Employees in Steel and Coal Industries: Germany (BDR), NRW and Ruhr Region (KVR)
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